The multifaceted nature of cyber-physical systems needs holistic study methods to detect essential aspects and interrelations among physical and cyber components. Like the systems themselves, security threats feature both cyber and physical elements. Although to apply divide et impera approaches helps handling system complexity, to consider just one aspect at a time does not provide adequate risk awareness and hence does not allow to design the most appropriate countermeasures. To support this claim, in this paper we provide a joint application of two model-driven techniques for physical and cyber-security evaluation. We apply two UML profiles, namely SecAM (for cyber-security) and CIP_VAM (for physical security), in combination. In such a way, we demonstrate the synergy between both profiles and the need for their tighter integration in the context of a reference case study from the railway domain.
Introduction
Cyber-physical systems emerged as a branch of the embedded systems research specifically focused on the interaction between the computational elements and the physical entities [1] . When research on cyber-physical systems overlaps with the emerging paradigms of smart-cities, Internet-of-Things and 5 intelligent transportation, to name a few, then security issues become critical whereas distributed systems can be exposed to both physical and cyber-threats.
It is a matter of fact that while researchers seem to be well-aware of the physical effects of cyber-threats, much of the research on information, on "logical", or on "cyber" security are not related to physical sensing. However, many threats to 10 cyber-physical systems (especially when they are isolated from the Internet) are also originated from physical intrusions, e.g., intruders accessing control terminals in technical rooms. This kind of information should be fused with the one coming from logical intrusion detection to provide a superior situation awareness and early warnings; thus, merging physical with logical access control allows to 15 recognise otherwise undetectable identity frauds.
Many safety-critical systems, as the ones used for railway control, are unreachable from the Internet but have technical equipment located in geographically distributed shelters and used for actuation, power, and telecommunications. This equipment is normally used by maintainers and other authorised 20 personnel, but can be potentially targeted by unauthorised personnel through the same physical access points. Since trackside shelters and technical rooms are nowadays equipped with physical security and environmental monitoring devices, security threat analysis can be advantageously fed with both physical and logical elements [2] . 25 Nowadays, holistic modelling of complex systems is still a challenging research issue, being largely accepted that the more promising and scalable ap-proaches focus on modularity and composability (both in modelling and solving). Another promising research effort aims at using as much as possible de facto standards in systems modelling, as the Unified Modelling Language (UML) In this paper, we take advantage of two novel UML profiles, namely Security Analysis and Modelling (SecAM) [3] and Critical Infrastructure Protection -Vulnerability Analysis and Modeling (CIP_VAM) [4] , to address the modelling of digital and physical security in combination. The approach moves from 40 separate usage of the two profiles, through a loosely coupled one, pointing towards a fully and strictly integrated profile including the modelling potential of both SecAM and CIP_VAM. Besides, we also show how each profile benefits by the information contained in the other in the formal models generated and used for quantitative security evaluations. We combine the usage of SecAM and
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CIP_VAM to exploit synergies in modelling and analysis of cyber and physical security aspects: from UML models annotated by both profiles, a cyber and physical security analysis can be performed coping with the complexity of critical infrastructure protection. We finally evaluate our approach in an intrusion scenario in railway trackside/lineside shelters.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work, introduces SecAM, CIP_VAM, and background needed to follow the rest of the paper. Section 3 describes the reference case study of the railway shelter used to motivate our research. Section 4 introduces the vulnerability modelling, considering separately physical and cyber security. Then, Section 5 55 considers them jointly, and proposes some modelling enhancements. Section 6 demonstrates the effectiveness of our approach by means of sensitivity analyses.
Finally, discussion and conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
Related Work and Background

Related Work
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Model-based evaluation of computer and network security has a long story, dating back to the first techniques to model and evaluate system dependability [5] . Dependability and security model-based evaluation approaches encompass combinatorial methods (e.g., based on Reliability Block Diagrams, Fault Trees, or Attack Trees), State-Based Stochastic Methods (e.g., through Markov
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Reward Models or Stochastic Petri Nets), Model Checking (e.g., automatic attack graphs generation [6] ), or a combined used of several methods and formalisms [7] . However, security of critical infrastructures like those for masstransit transportation is a multi-facet problem that requires an integrated approach taking into account digital (i.e., cyber) security as well as physical secu-70 rity, which is strictly related to system protection against intentional threats of physical nature. In physical vulnerability assessment, a quantitative notion of vulnerability is used and commonly defined as the likelihood that an attempted attack is successful [8] . In this direction, practical applications for vulnerability analysis use statistical approaches and mathematical modelling [9, 10] . Nev-75 ertheless, model-based approaches for cyber-security and physical security are separately considered and applied.
A recent trend in critical system modelling for security and dependability analysis envisions top-down model-driven approaches that automatically derive quantitative models. These approaches rely on DSMLs or UML profiles for 80 specification and modelling of a kind of systems. Model-driven processes enable automated modelling and analysis of different solutions during the overall system development life-cycle (for instance, security solutions or design choices) and they maybe easily integrated in industrial settings. So far, few DSMLs or profiles exist specifically tailored for modelling security and vulnerability as-85 pects of critical infrastructures. CORAS [11] assists in modelling and analysing the risk of changing systems in terms of their Quality of Service and fault tolerance characteristics. MARTE [12] is an OMG standard profile for modelling and analysing non-functional properties of real-time embedded systems. Similarly, Dependability Analysis and Modelling (DAM) [13] is a non-standard spe-90 cialization of MARTE that supports dependability analysis. Regarding UML profiles addressing security, UMLsec [14] allows to specify security information during the development of security-critical systems and provides tool-support for formal security verification. An UML extension is also proposed in [15] for model-based security assessment. UMLintr [16] is other profile for specifying in-95 trusion scenarios. Other UML profiles focus on security in grid computing [17] or distributed systems [18] . In this sense, CIP_VAM [4, 19] is a recent UML profile that addresses physical protection of critical infrastructures and provides tool support for automatic generation of vulnerability models based on Bayesian Networks (BNs). However, it does not consider cyber-security issues. Another 100 recent UML profile, SecAM [20, 3] , overcomes this issue since it allows specifying cyber-security aspects while enabling its assessment.
At the best of our knowledge, there are a lot of scientific works comparing UML profiles in different contexts but there are only few of them exploring the synergies of a joint use: in [21] , MARTE, SysML, and UMLSec are used to model 105 non-functional properties of telecommunication systems; in [22] , MARTE and MARTE-DAM are mixed to allow evaluation of performance and dependability.
With respect to these works, the proposed approach also pursues the objective of improving existing transformational approaches by the joint use of different UML profiles rather than to use existing transformations separately. A more detailed description of CIP_VAM subpackages can be found in [4] . is defined for each node in the network: for discrete random variables, it is often represented by a Conditional Probability Table (CPT) . Founded on the Bayes' theorem, BNs allow for inferring the posterior conditional probability distribution of a hypothesis (outcome variable) based on observed evidence and a prior belief in the probability of different hypotheses. 
The SecAM Profile and Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets
SecAM [20, 3] is an UML profile designed for the security analysis and mod-elling of software systems. It allows attack/resilience, cryptography, security mechanisms, and access control issues to be expressed within UML models. SecAM is built in the top of MARTE [12] and DAM [13] profile, which makes it a 135 powerful framework where performance, dependability, and security properties can be expressed. A more detailed description of SecAM subpackages can be found in [3] . A GSPN distinguishes two kind of transitions: immediate, which fire at zero time (i.e., its firing does not consume any time) and are represented by thin black bars; and timed, which can follow different firing distributions and are represented by white boxes. In this paper, we consider that delays of timed 150 transitions are exponentially distributed random variables.
Case Study: Lineside Shelter Scenario
This section describes the case-study of the lineside shelter protection system. Shelters are small buildings located in railway track sides. They usually contain electronic equipment performing control functions on interlocking de-155 vices (e.g., light signals, railway switches, etc.). As the complexity of railway systems increases, such functions are more and more demanded to computerbased systems, which are often connected to open networks. However, some commands to the railway devices are disallowed in a remote control scenario.
In these situations, shelter computers send diagnostic data to a Central Com-160 mand Center, while maintenance actions are performed only via a local terminal. Hence, since shelters feature critical security issues, appropriate protections must be employed. In nominal operating conditions, the shelter is accessed by maintenance personnel with their access keys. Maintainers log in the system via the terminal to 175 perform the required interventions, e.g., to fix some problems. Several threat scenarios can be considered where physical or cyber security are addressed separately: for example, the case of an unauthorised access to the room to steal some stuff, or a remote intrusion to sabotage the Traffic Server). Proper coun-termeasures can be activated to cope with these threats (e.g., fog generator and 180 user disconnection, respectively). Nevertheless, scenarios that combine physical and cyber attacks are also possible. Since we focus on combined attacks, let us consider the following scenario:
Insider Threat. A CyberPhysical Trudy, defined as an "intruder able to perform an attack requiring both physical and cyber actions", wants to sabotage 185 the Traffic Server. We assume here that the attacker is part of the personnel who is allowed to physically access the shelter room but not allowed to login the computer system with high privilege credentials (e.g., administrator). By correlating physical and logical credentials, the CPP Server recognises the intrusion and activates cyber-countermeasures (i.e., user session disconnection and 190 notification to the control room).
A misuse/anomaly network Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), used by most companies, detects logical intrusions into the server. However, traditional
IDSs do not correlate physical access control and logical access control information and therefore they are unable to detect threats as the one described 195 above. 
Vulnerability Modelling of the Insider Threat Scenario
Physical Protection in CIP_VAM
This subsection shows how the CIP_VAM approach is used in the Insider
Threat scenario to evaluate the vulnerability of the system against the attack. At this aim the CIP_VAM profile is used to annotate the infrastructure (the shelter room), the asset to defend (the signalling service provided by the shelter), the protection system (the access control mechanism, the presence sensor, and the fog generator), as well as the sequence of steps performed by the intruder.
In [4] , attacks are represented by Use Cases and an Activity is associated the following CIP_VAM stereotypes are used: «Site» is used to annotate the 220 Room representing the shelter; «Service» is used to annotate the Signalling Logic (it specifies the main asset of the system by setting a proper value for the asset tagged value); «ProtectionDevice» is used for protection mechanisms that are not sensors but security actuators (e.g., the fog generator); «Sensor» is used for the DoorAccess, the CyberPhysical IDS, and the Presence Sensor.
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Each of these sensors protects an infrastructural item, i.e., the Room (Presence Sensor ) and the Door (DoorAccess).
Each step that is part of the attack scenario (also from a protection point of view) is annotated with the «Action» stereotype and enriched with useful information by means of proper tagged values.
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An M2M transformation is used to derive the BN model, according to the rules sketched below.
Rule "Action" nodes. A true/false BN node is generated for each «Action» A:
the true value means that the corresponding attack step has been successfully accomplished, otherwise the attack step failed/has been neutralised. An arc is 235 generated to A from each BN node corresponding to an «Action» T A in the TriggeredBy list of A, and from each BN node corresponding to a «Protection» P A that has A in its Counteracts list 2 . Hence, the CPT of A takes into account the SuccessProb value of P A, P r(succ P A ), and OccurrenceProb of T A, P r(occ T A ). An example is reported in Table 1 . The case of more than a T A 240 and/or P A can be dealt with supposing that at least one true T A is needed to activate A and that at least one P A is needed to be true to inhibit A; hence, the CPT of A can implement a "noisy-OR" mechanism.
Rule "Sensor" nodes. A pair (S S , S E ) of true/false BN nodes is generated for each «Sensor» S. S S represents the availability/unavailability of S; the true 245 value of S S (with probability FailureRate) means that the device is working; otherwise, it is down. An arc is generated from S S to S E which in turn models the effect of the sensor S: the true value of S E means the sensor successfully senses/measures the event/quantity for which it is in charge of. An arc is also added to S E from each BN node corresponding to any «Action» that may be 250 performed against infrastructural items («Site», «Object» or «Service») in its Protects list. Finally, the CPT of S E takes into account the trustworthiness of S in terms of its false positive rate (Fpr ) and false negative rate (Fnr ) [19] . same meaning respectively of S S and S E ; hence, this rule works as the previous
one. An example is reported in Table 2 . Table 1 : CPT related to the Rule "Action".
T A P A A = true A = false true true (1 − P r(succ P A )) · P r(occ T A ) 1 − (1 − P r(succ P A )) · P r(occ T A ) true false P r(occ T A ) 1 − P r(occ T A ) false -0 1 
Cyber Protection in SecAM
Herein, the SecAM approach is used in the Insider Threat scenario to perform 260 a vulnerability assessment. To this aim, SecAM is used to explicitly annotate the step sequence performed by an intruder.
The Insider Threat scenario described by the UML-SD in Figure 3 A CyberPhysical Trudy, stereotyped as an unclassified subject, has authorisation to access to the room. This triggers the enter action of the user, which is notified by the Door Access Monitor to the CyberPhysical IDS (CP_IDS for short). The CyberPhysical IDS boosts traditional IDSs by adding the capa-280 bility to correlate physical and logical events enabling the modelling approach proposed in this paper. Then, the subject gains authorisation access to the terminal access by performing an attack with a probability of P r(attack) (sensitive analysis parameter). Let us assume that the attacker is able to obtain a valid password by means of brute-force attack or by social engineering techniques. A 285 valid password allows her to get privilege escalation, as she is able to obtain a granted access through the Terminal Access Monitor. Once the attacker has logged in, action log of user2 is triggered, whereas a notification is sent by the
Terminal Access Monitor to the CP_IDS. The CP_IDS is stereotyped as lo- cated at the host, having a hit rate of 1 (an ideal CP_IDS), reactive defence 290 type, and stateful-based detection.
The intruder proceeds now to sabotage the Signalling Logic, a security object stereotyped with a Confidential level. Meanwhile, the CP_IDS checks whether the logged user matches with the last user who accessed through the door into the room. When there is not a match (which happens with the 295 same probability than attack in fact, annotated with secaStep stereotype), the CP_IDS alerts the Firewall that closes the active connection. Lastly, the CP_IDS propagates the user disconnection to the rest of system elements.
The UML-SD described in Figure 3 can be transformed to a formal model suitable for evaluation. In this paper, we used well-established approaches [25, 300 26] to obtain a Petri Net (namely, a GSPN [24] ) from the previous UML-SD. CyberPhysicalTrudy access is represented by firing of transition t 1 . An access request will eventually reach place p 7 that represents the attempt of login into the terminal, annotated with a occurrence probability of π 7 = P r(attack) (see the optional UML-SD in Figure 3 ). Thus, a malicious access request is finally discarded as indicated by transition t 8 (with probability π 8 = 1 − P r(attack)).
310
The acquire (release) of a resource has been transformed into a transition with an input (output) arc. For instance, transition t 1 represents the acquire of the Door Access Monitor, while T 2 represents the release of such resource after some action (represented by the own T 2 ). Activities and self-messages have been transformed into an exponential transition in the Petri net model. The duration 315 of these transitions may be indicated in the UML model using MARTE [12] .
For the sake of readability, we have not depicted these annotations.
Joint Use of SecAM and CIP_VAM
In this section we show the advantages of the jointly usage of the CIP_VAM and SecAM approaches. The M2M transformation generating the BN (resp. 320 GSPN) from a UML model annotated with CIP_VAM (resp. SecAM) stereotypes can be defined by taking into account information coming from SecAM (resp. CIP_VAM) annotations, as proposed in the next subsections.
Improving the CIP_VAM approach
Here, a "SecAM-aware" extension of the CIP_VAM approach is proposed in 325 order to improve its effectiveness. One of the features that SecAM deals with in a more clear and straightforward way, is the management of the access control mechanisms.
The weakness of the BN model shown in Figure 4 is in the node isNotMatching. In fact, its aim is to model the procedure by which the CP_IDS detects Figure 6 ). Of course, additional arcs are also generated between nodes, but we omit a deeper description of the rule for sake of brevity. 
Improving the SecAM approach
Similarly, in this section we consider a "CIP_VAM-aware" extension of the model transformation shown in Section 4.2 in order to improve its effective-350 ness. The major advantage of CIP_VAM is its ability to annotate the concrete events that trigger interaction among system components. By bringing these annotations to a UML model, a PN model can be conformed where system state transitions depend on the occurrence of specific events. with this place, given that such a transition represents the execution of the action. Finally, a test arc connects the place to transition t 10 , since this transition represents the step triggered by the previous gainUnathAccess() method in the UML-SD. Besides, the failure CIP_VAM tagged-value adds also a decision in the model, represented by place p and transitions t 1 , t 2 , having a probability 370 of occurrence given by the value of failure (i.e., π t 1 = P r(doorAccF R) and
The obtained PN model when considering both CIP_VAM and SecAM profiles is a suitable model for qualitative and quantitative evaluation. For instance, a probabilistic model checker tool can be used to verify that the sequence of trig-375 gered events is correct. In the next section, we quantitatively evaluate the model by comparing the effect of failure rate in attack success.
Analysis of the Insider Threat Scenario
This section demonstrates how the evaluation of the vulnerability related to the Insider Threat scenario can benefit from the joint modelling of cyber and 380 physical security concerns. To pursue this objective, we analyse the models m P , m P , generated by applying the transformations from CIP_VAM to BN described in Sections 4.1 and 5.1, as well as the models m C , and m C generated by applying the transformations from SecAM to GSPN described in Sections 4.2 and 5.2. Models m P , m P , are analysed against the variation of a "cyber-
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related" parameter while m C , m C , against the variation of a "physical-related"
parameter. The values used in this study are reported in Table 3 . Some of them refer to frequencies (i.e., they are expressed in hrs −1 ). As they all refer to the same time period (one hour), they are considered non-dimensional and used to define probabilities. P r(f irewall) Success probability of the firewall 0.8 P r(terminalF R)
Failure Rate of the terminal 10
P r(terminal) Success probability of the terminal 0.9
The models m P and m P are analysed against variations of the access control policy. In particular, three cases are considered: (i) no logical access control;
(ii) confidentiality levels are used to determine the logical access (i.e., the Cy- P r(exit = true|gainU nauthAccess(phy) = true) (see Figure 4) 4 .
The obtained results for the probability of a success in case of attack are:
(i) 1.82 · 10 −2 ; (ii) 6.36 · 10 −2 ; and (iii) 1.90 · 10 −1 . The model m P is more accurate than m P since it takes into account the adopted access control policy.
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Specifically, m P underestimates the probability of having a successful attack,
given that the attacker performs the physical and cyber accesses with the same identity. The difference between the two vulnerability evaluations is one order of magnitude.
The models m C and m C are analysed against variations of the failure rate 410 of the door access device: its value is chosen in an neighbourhood of its default value. Specifically, m C is analysed considering these values: 10 −1 , 10 −2 and 10 −3 in order to show how variation influences the overall vulnerability analysis.
These results are also compared with the results of the analysis of m C (where it is assumed that the attacker is always successful in compromising the door 415 access control) in order to show the effectiveness of the approach. Figure 8 depicts the analysis results. We measured the system's performance by computing the throughput of transition t 1 under different door access failure 4 The formula follows the more generic one P r(success = true|attack = true)). In this specific case, the names of the BN nodes are computed from the first and the last «Action»stereotyped messages in the attack scenario model in Figure 3 . rates. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all timed transitions take 1ms to fire. In all cases, performance decreases as the attack probability increases.
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Results of model m C represent the case where failure rate is always occurring and thus the system performance is the lowest. As expected, the performance of the system increases when door access failure rate decreases. Let us remark that the use of CIP_VAM enables to consider physical failures in the model, clearly improving it since it is closer to real world situations where security of 425 physical elements can be compromised.
Discussion and conclusions
While holistic approaches in system security are theoretically able to take a picture of all the relevant system aspects and security threats, it does not seem to exist any single modelling language able to manage the complex structure 430 and behaviours of such systems as a whole. Therefore, the only viable solution is to extend existing modelling languages and possibly to design novel hybrid formalisms.
In this paper, we have addressed the limits of model-driven approaches when modelling cyber-only or physical-only security aspects in cyber-physical systems, In this context, we have highlighted some issues in separated cyber and physical security modelling, and proposed a possible solution. We are aware that the 445 way is still long and further steps are needed also in order to propose this solution in other applicative domains. Of course, the loosely coupled approach here presented must be improved: model transformations must be further detailed, multi-formalism techniques may be investigated to provide inter-operation between derived models, a tight integration of the two UML profiles can allow to 450 define a more comprehensive and usable modelling language. Nevertheless, we believe that the work presented in this paper is a concrete and first step towards cyber-physical vulnerability modelling and analysis. 
